

from the accommodating approach toward Islam pursued by Catherine the Great (at least within the empire) and her immediate successors (28). Historians of imperial Russia's Muslim policies have attributed this change of attitude, among other things, to the anti-Russian resistance in the Northern Caucasus that took place under the green banner. Kozelsky demonstrates that Russian "pacification" of the Caucasus had a direct bearing upon Russian treatment of the Crimean Tatars during and after the war. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Russian command redeployed some Cossack regiments from the Caucasus to Crimea, where they engaged in continued harassment of the Muslim population (59–60). The policy of depopulating the coastal areas of the Western Caucasus also informed the decision of the Russian command to deport the Crimean Tatars from the coastal areas of Crimea to prevent their contacts with the allied troops (132).

Kozelsky argues that Russian hostility toward the Tatars peaked after the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris (1856), when the governor-general of New Russia A. G. Stroganov insisted on the desirability of replacing them with a more loyal and "productive" population. Although Tsar Alexander II found the emigration of the Tatars to the Ottoman Empire desirable, the expulsion plan contemplated by Stroganov was thwarted by the already mentioned Ministry of State Domains (170–172). According to Kozelsky, the emigration of around two hundred thousand Crimean Tatars, which took place several years later, was a combination of push and pull factors (194–198). It profoundly changed the demographic balance of the peninsula and contributed greatly to the process of Christianization in Crimea, which was the subject of Kozelsky's previous monograph *Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond* (2010).

Finally, Kozelsky's book challenges the usual interpretation of imperial Russia's "humiliating defeat" as a catalyst of the Great Reforms, which included the abolition of serfdom as well as the reorganization of judiciary, provincial, and municipal institutions. In one influential interpretation, all these reforms were necessary in order to render possible much-needed military modernization (i.e., the replacement of the serf-based army created by Peter the Great in 1699 by the one based on universal military service). Kozelsky reveals the limits of this "challenge-and-response" theory by pointing to the modernizing effects of the war itself. Thus, the reports from the theater of war boosted imperial Russia's literacy rates, while the war relief efforts demonstrate the emergence of Russia's civil society (205–206). In sum, Kozelsky's account of the traumatic and transformative impact of the Crimean War will attract historians of imperial Russia as well as all those interested in the subject of war and society in the modern period.

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JERONIM PEROVIĆ. *From Conquest to Deportation: The North Caucasus under Russian Rule*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xxiv, 466. Cloth \$90.00.

The title of Jeronim Perović's *From Conquest to Deportation: The North Caucasus under Russian Rule* refers to the Russian imperial exile of the North Caucasus mountain peoples to the Ottoman Empire in 1864, and then to the Soviet-era deportations of these peoples to Central Asia in 1943–1944. Perović resists the idea of this tragic history as simply exploitive or "colonial" and instead tries to highlight cases and characters that illustrate collaboration and Russia's incorporation of frontier nobilities into a multiethnic service elite, which has been described by Andreas Kappeler and many other scholars. Russia's "integrative strategies," however, were largely unsuccessful, and the history of the North Caucasus was shaped by opposition and rebellion (10). In the nineteenth century only a "thin layer" of North Caucasus society, he writes, worked as teachers, businessmen, officers, and others who might qualify as an "intelligentsia" (99). Highly privileged figures who offered their allegiance to Russian rule often viewed the matter as a temporary alliance, or as a means of "protection from third parties through association with a strong external partner" (28). Musa Alkhozovich Kundukhov, for example, a Muslim of Ossetian origin, became a general in the Imperial Army and the chief administrator of Vladikavkaz Military District and then Terek Oblast (largely inhabited by Chechens). He left the region for the Ottoman Empire, however, along with some five thousand families, with the majority comprising Chechens. Two of his brothers had fought with Shamil in the war against Russia, and he eventually fought on the Ottoman side in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878.

Village life was even more distant from the world of Russia and the Soviet Union. After Shamil's famous capture in 1859 by General Aleksandr Bariatinskii, in Dagestan alone there were eighteen significant armed revolts between 1859 and 1877, and the situation worsened significantly in 1877. Schooling was minimal, with only a limited number of missionary schools established by the Society for the Restoration of Orthodoxy (founded in 1860) supplementing the secular "mountain schools" in Vladikavkaz, Nal'chik, Temir-Khan Shura, Groznyi, Sukhum, and other small settlements. In the 1897 census, less than 1 percent of the respondents in the North Caucasus who identified their native language as Chechen stated that they could read Russian. The Terek region, on the other hand, had 115 *madrassas* (Islamic higher institutes of study) and 138 Islamic primary schools. The regime never established a *muftiate* or ecclesiastical administration for the North Caucasus, as it did for Muslims in the Volga region and Crimea, since they feared ceding authority to local

religious figures (85–95). Many regime officials also viewed the Sufi orders of the North Caucasus as an illegitimate form of Islam. The mountain inhabitants did not serve in the military; in fact, Perović emphasizes, the tsarist regime was afraid to give them guns.

The Soviet regime was more powerful and ambitious but just as unsuccessful in its efforts to transform the region. “Socialist remodeling project[s]” such as collectivization provoked opposition, and the Bolsheviks as well were limited in their efforts to “overcome economic ways of life, legal customs and primordial social bonds” (258). Perović’s fascinating discussion of military service in the Soviet era illustrates continuity with the imperial period. By the late 1930s, the Soviet regime was attempting to impose universal conscription on non-Russians, but its efforts remained sporadic in the North Caucasus. “Like the tsar’s administrators before them,” writes Perović, “the Bolsheviks too were quite reluctant to give large bodies of men from the Caucasus access to weapons and military training” (268). The combination of the Soviet fear of internal dissent with the arrival of the external threat posed by the Germans led to the tragic deportations. Stalin canceled the order to recruit soldiers from the North Caucasus just two days after Hitler ordered the June 28, 1942, southern drive to capture the Caucasus oil fields (275). Some seventy thousand Karachaians were deported in November 1943, as well as roughly four hundred thousand Chechens, ninety thousand Ingush, and just over thirty-seven thousand Balkars the following year. Politburo officials were closely involved in the process. In case anyone missed the history lesson, Soviet authorities re-erected a statue in Grozny to General Ermolov, the famously belligerent Russian conqueror from the early nineteenth century, which had been taken down after the revolution (287).

Perović effectively uses memoirs and “life stories” from North Caucasus figures such as Kundukhov; Sheikh Ali Mitaev, a victim of the Soviet regime in the 1920s; Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, a Chechen historian arrested in 1937; and Khasan Israilov, a resistance fighter against Soviet rule, to complement his use of numerous archives in Russia and the North Caucasus. This fruitful method might be extended to include attention to the views of state builders and proponents of integration, such as the linguist Petr Uslar, the historian and ethnographer Adol’f P. Berzhe, and the Armenian administrator of Terek Oblast who later served in St. Petersburg, Mikhail T. Loris-Melikov. Critics can always suggest one more pertinent archive, of course. The National Archives of Georgia in Tbilisi has numerous relevant materials in Russian, the Russian Central State Military Historical Archive in Moscow has rich materials on nineteenth-century “military-civilian” administration, and the Russian Academy of Sciences Archive in St. Petersburg has a collection dedicated to Berzhe. This comprehensive and concise volume will

be extremely useful to scholars, students, and a reading public alarmed by the recent history of Russian-Chechen relations.

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VICTORIA SMOLKIN. *A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018. Pp. xvi, 339. Cloth \$45.00.

Atheism appears to be a straightforward concept, but for Soviet communists it was not. Victoria Smolkin’s *A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism* explores how the meaning and implementation of atheism were debated and redefined over the course of the entire history of the Soviet Union. Being good Marxists, Soviet communists understood that religion was antithetical to communism. They had been taught by Marx that once the material conditions for religion had been eradicated, religion would wither away. But once the Soviet Union was modernized, and most of its population comprised literate, urban workers and intelligentsia members, believers remained and new believers converted. Atheism became not simply the extinction of religion. It was an ideology that had to fill the role religion had played. It needed to provide meaning to people’s lives, to follow them from cradle to grave, and to engage their emotions and comfort them. Smolkin is interested in the productive side of the atheism project: how it forced communists to come up with an alternative cosmology. In attempting to define atheism—a feat party members and social scientists never agreed upon—they had to define communism. Like many recent monographs on Soviet history, this book provides a new answer for why Soviet communism failed. But Smolkin does not provide one piece to that puzzle; she provides *the* piece. For atheism’s failure in the Soviet Union was intrinsically entwined with communism’s.

Arranged chronologically, the monograph begins with the early physical attacks on religious institutions and personnel, and ends with Gorbachev’s acceptance of religion as part of Soviet life. During World War II and the difficult first postwar years, atheist work ceased as Stalin mobilized and co-opted religion, in particular the Russian Orthodox Church, into becoming subordinate to the Soviet state. Khrushchev, who was committed to reaching communism within his reign, returned to atheist work, even reviving the destruction and closure of churches. But the Communist Party quickly became aware that these attacks on religion were backfiring; the number of religious rites performed actually increased. And as the new cadres of social scientists devoted to atheism began their studies, they quickly became troubled: some local party members were believers, and many believers did not see a contradiction between believing in the two opposing